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Surprisingly little academic attention has been devoted to ascertaining
the true nature and function of aggravated damages. In itself, this is not
a problem. But the fact that those who have reflected on these issues
generally divide into two diametrically opposed schools of thought is
both perplexing and question-begging. On the one hand there are those
who believe that “aggravated damages are effectively indistinguishable
from punitive damages”;1 while on the other there are those who side
with the Law Commission’s view that aggravated damages are no more
than a particular species of compensatory damages which are some-
times awarded to claimants in respect of mental distress.2 The differ-
ence in function – punishment versus compensation – could hardly be
more pronounced.
Given the profound divide between these two schools thought, the
theoretical case for exploring the nature and purpose of such awards
becomes patent enough. But bearing in mind the fact that such
damages are sought fairly frequently (especially in the context of
actions against the police), there is also an important practical dimen-
sion to the enquiry.
With these prefatory comments in mind, the two main aims of this
article can now be stated. The first is to present a robust explanatory
account of aggravated damages: that is, one which is to a significant
degree supportable by the leading authorities.3 En route to doing so, it
will be shown that neither of the two major schools of thought fare
* School of Law, University of Manchester. Thanks to Neil Duxbury, Neil Foster, Francesco
Giglio, Paula Giliker, Peter Gooderham, William Lucy, Jason Neyers, Amanda Odell-West, Ken
Oliphant and Stephen Waddams who all supplied detailed or otherwise helpful comments on
drafts of this article at various stages of its gestation.
1 P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford 1997), p. 114; A. Robertson, “Constraints on Policy-
Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A. Robertson and W.H. Tang (eds.), The Goals of Private
Law (Oxford 2009), p. 276; A. Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge 1999)
p. 151. Feldthusen offers a slightly nuanced version of this position positing that, while a
theoretical distinction can be drawn between aggravated and exemplary damages, there is probably
no practical difference between them: see B. Feldthusen, “Punitive Damages: Hard Choices and
High Stakes” [1998] New Zealand L. Rev. 714, at 750.
2 Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Com No 247 (1997),
para 2.1. See also R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford 2007), p. 85 for a similar interpretation.
3 It is possible, also, to look to the law that we find in practice when constructing a theory of the law
(see, e.g., J. Levin, Tort Wars (Cambridge 2008); J. Coleman,Risks andWrongs (Cambridge 1992),
p. 8). But the empirical demands associated with supplying an account that explains both the law
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particularly well when tested in this way. The second aim is to explore
the proper (or, at least, potential) domain of aggravated damages; for it
is sometimes claimed, but never rigorously shown, that aggravated
damages have neither a place in the tort of negligence nor in the context
of breach of contract.4 In this respect it will be argued that, once the
true nature of aggravated damages has been clarified, there is no reason
in principle why they should be excluded absolutely from these two
realms.
II. TWO UNTENABLE ACCOUNTS
A. Aggravated damages as punishment
For those who see no distinction between aggravated and exemplary
damages, Lord Devlin must be taken to have failed in his endeavour to
“remove from the law a source of confusion between aggravated and
exemplary damages … which has troubled learned commentators on
the subject”.5 But at least from an English perspective there are several
reasons why this position is ultimately unappealing. First, there is a
distinct lack of authority for the view that aggravated and exemplary
damages are ultimately the same. So, although Peter Cane, Andrew
Robertson and Arthur Ripstein are all on record as subscribing to this
view, not one of them cites a single case in support of their position.6
The second reason for doubting the conclusion that aggravated
damages serve a punitive function can be drawn from the reasoning
deployed by Cane to justify this claim. He says this:
Such damages may be awarded even if the tort victim suffers no
compensatable loss, but only humiliation, outrage or indignity.7
[Yet] [i]t is doubtful whether wilfully or intentionally inflicting
outrage or indignity on a person is tortious in itself.8
in the decided cases and the law in practice are too great for the present enterprise. Consequently,
all that is essayed here is an account that seems best to fit the most important of the reported cases.
4 See, e.g., the Law Commission, op. cit. n. 2, at para 1.10: “[a]ggravated damages cannot be
awarded for the tort of negligence or for breach of contract”. The only authority cited for this
rather bald assertion is the non-authoritative first instance case of Kralj v. McGrath [1986] 1 All
E.R. 54. Further judicial support for this view can be gleaned from the speech of Stuart Smith L.J.
in AB v. South West Water Services Ltd. [1993] Q.B. 507, 528 where the correctness of what was
said in Kralj was quoted with approval but without analysis.
5 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1230.
6 In his Anatomy (op. cit. n. 1), Cane spends just seven lines outlining his understanding of the
nature of aggravated damages. Robertson (op. cit. n. 1) offers only four words asserting (but not
showing) that punitive damages “respond to dignitary loss”, while Ripstein (op. cit. n. 1) also fails
to stretch his analysis beyond a single page. In fairness to these Commonwealth jurists, however, a
strong argument can be made to support their assertions insofar as the judges in their countries
rejected the reasoning in Rookes v. Barnard and the insistence therein that the use of exemplary
damages should be severely restricted: see, e.g., Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd. [1966] 117
C.L.R. 118; Taylor v. Beere (1982) 1 N.Z.L.R. 81.
7 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (Cambridge 2006), p. 420.
8 Loc. cit.
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The flaw is to assume the very thing he really ought to be proving:
namely, that a loss of dignity is not a compensable loss. Just because a
loss of dignity is not actionable in its own right is no basis for con-
cluding that it can never form the basis of compensation. We do not in
general terms have a right not to have economic loss inflicted on us, but
(even leaving to one side those exceptional cases where it has been
regarded as actionable in its own right) it has long been recognised as a
form of compensable loss where it occurs in conjunction with the in-
fringement of some or other right that is actionable. There is no reason
to rule out an equivalent approach to dignity. So, just as economic loss
will readily be compensated where it is contingent upon negligently
inflicted property damage, so, too, are we free to regard the loss of
dignity as compensable where it arises in conjunction with, say, a fraud,
battery or false imprisonment. This, indeed, is what happens.
The third reason for maintaining a difference between aggravated
and exemplary damages is rather a technocratic one. Section 1(2)(a) of
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 expressly pro-
hibits the post-death survival of actions in respect exemplary damages,
but no such prohibition exists in relation to aggravated damages.
Furthermore, the House of Lords has signalled a willingness to permit
claims for such damages by the estate of a deceased person.9 As such,
the conclusion that they are categorically different is irresistible.
B. Aggravated damages for mental distress
Probably the most prominent advocates of the idea that aggravated
damages comprise a peculiar species of compensatory damages some-
times awarded in respect of mental distress are the Law Commission.
For them, the starting point for understanding aggravated damages
was Lord Devlin’s speech in the then leading case of Rookes v. Barnard.
According to Lord Devlin:
in cases where the damages are at large the jury (or the judge if the
award is left to him) can take into account the motives and con-
duct of the defendant where they aggravate the injury done to the
plaintiff. There may be malevolence or spite or the manner of
committing the wrong may be such as to injure the plaintiff’s
proper feelings of dignity or pride. These are matters which the jury
can take into account in assessing the appropriate compensation.10
Conspicuous by its absence in this passage is any mention of the in-
fliction of mental distress which the Law Commission considered to be
so central. Without explicit mention of it by his Lordship, one wonders
9 See Ashley v. Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 A.C. 962 (discussed in section
III, below).
10 [1964] A.C. 1129, at 1221 per Lord Devlin (emphasis added).
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why the Commissioners concluded that: “[a]lthough the precise mean-
ing and function of ‘aggravated damages’ is unclear, the best view, in
accordance with Lord Devlin’s authoritative analysis in Rookes v.
Barnard, appears to be that they are damages awarded for a tort as
compensation for the plaintiff’s mental distress”.11 It is of course true
that there will be many instances in which the defendant’s conduct
causes both injury to dignity and mental distress, but there is no
reason – either as a matter of common sense or law – why injury to
one’s “proper feelings of dignity” should be seen as contingent upon, or
synonymous or coextensive with, mental distress.12
In section III(B), I shall explain at length why it is important that an
objective construction (which negates the need for sentience on the part
of the victim) must be placed on Lord Devlin’s reference to a claimant’s
“proper feelings of dignity or pride”. But for now it is sufficient to note
that there is clear support for this construction within the existing case
law. For example, in one case involving a more or less instantaneous
murder that took place in extremely horrific circumstances, the judge
nonetheless granted an award of aggravated damages observing that,
although the victim “was immediately murdered [and thus suffered no
distress or feelings of indignity] … I have no doubt that an award is
justified … [given] the circumstances in which he was assaulted”.13
Equally, in Ashley v. Chief Constable of Sussex,14 another case involv-
ing an immediate death (caused by a police officer’s shooting of a
suspect), the House of Lords notably did not rule out the defendant’s
potential liability to pay aggravated damages.15 Finally, it is notable
that even a corporation has been awarded aggravated damages despite
the impossibility of it experiencing any feelings at all.16
Having stripped away the requirement of sentience in respect of real
persons, we recognise readily, and as a matter of common sense, that it
is entirely possible to injure the dignity of the infantile, the unconscious
and others lacking sufficient mental awareness even though they may
11 Law Commission, op. cit. n. 2, at para 2.1.
12 Allan Beever has argued that one can distinguish mental distress from a loss of dignity on the basis
that “dignity is not a feeling … [so that] the claimant may be entitled to aggravated damages [even]
though she is not distressed”: see A. Beever, “The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary
Damages” (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 87, at 90. While Beever is correct, his claim nonetheless presumes
something that ought to be shown (and which I show below): namely, that Lord Devlin – who of
course made explicit reference to “feelings” – is best understood as anchoring an award of
aggravated damages to an objective loss of dignity per se, rather than a subjective sense of that
loss.
13 Shah v. Gale [2005] EWHC 1087, at [58]–[59].
14 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 A.C. 962.
15 No such damages were ultimately paid in the case because the defence of self-defence could be
invoked to justify the police officer’s shooting of the suspect.
16 Messenger Newspaper Group Ltd. v. National Geographic Association [1984] I.R.L.R. 397. While
the case lends clear support to the idea that sentience is not a prerequisite for an award of
aggravated damages, it is dubious insofar as it is hard to see how a mere corporation can possess
dignity. See further n. 73 below.
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not personally experience an affront to their dignity.17 Perhaps more
importantly, though, there is strong evidence to suggest that, as a
matter of English law, the term “mental distress” is generally taken to
refer to something qualitatively different from the feelings of punctured
pride, shame, embarrassment or worthlessness that tend to characterise
injured dignity.18 Thus, using an electronic database,19 653 cases could
be found at the time of writing in which the courts have dealt with
aggravated damages, yet in only 63 of these was there any mention of
mental distress. Equally, a search based on “mental distress” revealed a
total of 410 cases, but in only 46 of these was dignity also mentioned.
Furthermore, closer inspection of the mental distress cases revealed
that they were typically characterised by claimants suffering one of
three things: a condition falling short of a recognised psychiatric illness
(in what are generally called “nervous shock” cases);20 a condition
brought about by the stresses and strains of being overworked;21 the
anxiety associated with medical misdiagnoses.22 Yet none of these
things – witnessing unsettling events, being overworked or having
medical conditions misdiagnosed – enjoys any obvious or immutable
link with the dignitary interest to which Lord Devlin specifically
anchored awards of aggravated damages.
***
What this section has sought to reveal is that neither of the two most
prominent accounts of aggravated damages provides a very satisfac-
tory explanation of their true nature and that, consequently, an
alternative, more compelling account is needed. One notable attempt to
fill this explanatory gap has been offered by Allan Beever.23 In his view,
aggravated damages are observably different from both punitive
damages and damages for mental distress on the basis that aggravated
damages are only available (and are the only kind of damages avail-
able) in respect of “an injury to the victim’s moral dignity that results
from the defendant’s denial that the victim is entitled to respect as
17 It is because sentience logically cannot be taken as a precondition of an award of aggravated
damages that an alternative account, which sees such damages as assuaging “the anger and
outrage felt by the victim of a tort”, cannot ultimately fare any better than the one advanced by the
Law Commission. For just such an account, see N. J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, Tort Law
(Harlow 2008), pp. 682–683.
18 A similar distinction could be made under Roman law. As Peter Birks has explained, “[t]he tort the
Romans called inuria… [involved] contemptuous harassment of another … [and protected] not an
interest in emotional calm, but the victim’s right to his or her proper respect”: P. Birks,
“Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect” (1997) 32 Irish Jurist 1, at 11.
19 Westlaw.
20 See, e.g., Calveley v. Chief Constable of Merseyside [1989] A.C. 1228; Reilly v. Merseyside RHA
[1995] 6 Med. L. Rev. 246.
21 See, e.g., Barber v. Somerset CC [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1089.
22 See, e.g., Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 268.
23 Op. cit. n. 12. A like-minded, but analytically mixed, account can be found in J. Berryman,
“Reconceptualizing Aggravated Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential
Loss” (2004) 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1521.
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a moral person”.24 So far as it goes, this observation is largely to be
applauded. One problem with it, however, is that it only takes us part
of the way.25 So, while Beever correctly suggests that aggravated
damages serve to “compensate for violations of dignitary interests”26 he
signally fails to explain just what those dignitary interests are or entail.
He also fails to tell us how he gets from Lord Devlin’s reference to “the
plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity” to the protection of dignity per se
(which, as we have already seen, can perfectly well be infringed without
the claimant necessarily feeling anything). These matters are both cru-
cial. But what requires elaboration in the first instance is a serviceable
understanding of the dignitary interest that underpins awards of
aggravated damages.
III. THE NATURE AND ROLE OF THE DIGNITARY INTEREST
It has already been suggested that aggravated damages are best re-
garded as a form of reparation for the harm occasioned to one’s dig-
nity. Thus, although the leading cases tend to stress the presence of
high-handed or arrogant conduct on the part of the defendant,27 it
would be a mistake to think that such conduct is the key to under-
standing aggravated damages.28 As Beever has explained, the search for
such conduct is a mere means to an end: it is only necessary “to dis-
cover the injury [to dignity]” given that “our sole epistemological access
to the claimant’s injury is through the examination of the defendant’s
actions”.29 His point is that certain forms of conduct – though in tan-
gible terms no more harmful than other forms of conduct – are apt to
add insult to injury and it is by taking cognisance of the defendant’s
behaviour that we can identify where this has occurred; and an example
can help to illustrate it. If I knock another patron’s drink over her in a
cafe´ by accident, the tangible damage caused is precisely the same as if I
24 Loc. cit. at 89. For a similar judicial view, see Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1099 per McIntyre J.: “they take account of intangible injuries and will
generally augment damages assessed under the general rules relating to the assessment of
damages”.
25 Only about 6 out of a total of 24 pages are devoted to analysing aggravated damages in Beever’s
essay; and the majority of this limited amount of space is concerned with undermining the
accounts of others.
26 Loc. cit. at 90.
27 See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1129 per Lord Devlin; Jolliffe v. Willmett & Co
[1971] 1 All E.R. 478, at 485 perGeoffrey Lane J.; Sutcliffe v. Pressdram Ltd. [1991] 1 Q.B. 153, at
184 per Nourse L.J.; Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130, at 1205–06 per Cory J.;
Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] Q.B. 498, at 516 per Lord Woolf
M.R.; Horsford v. Bird [2006] UKPC 3, [2006] 1 E.G.L.R., at [14] per Lord Scott.
28 For the view that such conduct is crucial, and that aggravated damages are designed to pacify the
claimant in the face of such treatment, see McBride and Bagshaw, op. cit. n. 17, pp. 682–684.
29 Beever, op. cit. n. 12, at 92–93. This is true only so long as the defendant was the actual actor.
Where the tort was committed by an employee, inspection of the defendant employer’s conduct
will not enlighten us as to the loss of dignity; only the conduct of the immediate tortfeasor – the
employee – can do this.
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knock it over deliberately. In both cases I may ruin her £500 suit and
cause some scalding to her legs. This does not mean, however, that the
patron feels the same in both cases. Oliver Wendell Holmes captured
the point well in his oft-quoted quip along the lines that even a dog can
tell the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.30 The
point is that, where the spillage is deliberate, insult to dignity is likely to
be added to the tangible injury caused. But the aggravated damages
due are to compensate the injury to dignity, not to punish the tort-
feasor.
It thus follows that, if we are properly to understand aggravated
damages, our central task must be to evince a clear conception of the
dignitary interest that they are designed to repair. For while the case
law provides ample guidance on what it means to engage in arrogant
and high-handed conduct, or to act with contumelious disregard for the
dignity of the claimant,31 it fails almost entirely to elucidate what the
dignitary interest entails. How, then, is this to be understood?
If we are to alight upon a serviceable understanding of the dignitary
interest protected by aggravated damages, a set of three key tasks must
be undertaken. The first, and most general, is to select from a sizeable
menu of competing conceptions of what dignity entails an under-
standing that is both meaningful within, and pertinent to, the sphere of
private law. Having done this, the next task is to assess whether in-
fringements of dignity are to be assessed on a subjective or an objective
basis (bearing in mind Lord Devlin’s reference to compensation for
injury to “the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity or pride”). The final
task is to disentangle the dignitary interest from the interest in repu-
tation which underpins the law of defamation,32 and with which it is apt
to be confused. To do so is important since there may be a danger of
under- or over-compensation, depending on which interests are actu-
ally harmed in any given case.
A. The dignitary interest in private law
Philosophers, theologians, political theorists and lawyers have all
grappled with the interest in (some would say, right to) dignity. But
even if viewed purely through the lens of the lawyer, we can identify a
range of related, yet observably different meanings which can be
ascribed to dignity. For example, it can be seen as a human right in and
of itself. It can also be seen, not as a human right per se, but as a sort of
30 The Common Law (New York 1991), p. 3.
31 For a summary of the kinds of conduct revealed by the case law, seeMcBride and Bagshaw, op. cit.
n. 17, pp. 684–686.
32 The classic definition of a defamatory statement is one “which is calculated to injure the
reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule”: Parmiter v. Coupland
(1840) 6 M & W 105, at 108 per Parke B.
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overarching principle which helps explain the range of more specific
human rights that we have;33 or even as a brake on the exercise of
certain other human rights (as in the elective abortions debate34).
Outside the human rights context, dignity can be used as a synonym for
the respect commanded by the political autonomy of sovereign states,
or as the basis for anti-discrimination laws, or laws designed to protect
and preserve a particular group or cultural identity.35 It can even be
invoked to underpin the essentially public law duty of equal concern
and respect owed by the state to all citizens.36
For present purposes, however, the appropriate conception of the
dignitary interest must reflect the essential characteristics of the kind of
private law action in which such damages may be sought. In saying
this, I do not mean to imply or suggest that private law can be defined
simply and accurately. The weight of scholarship points far too heavily
in the opposite direction.37 But even so, it can be asserted with some
confidence that the archetypal private law action will focus on the
rights and interests of the claimant as an individual.38 It is by virtue of
the fact that private law is overwhelmingly concerned with the breach
of duties owed to individuals qua individuals (rather than as, say, rep-
resentatives of society or humanity),39 that enables us to focus on
those aspects or notions of dignity that are placed in jeopardy when the
private rights of individuals are infringed. And because private law
only protects dignity to the extent that it is bound up with certain
recognised rights – such as the right to freedom of movement or the
right to bodily integrity – it is possible to disregard in this context very
broad or abstract conceptions of dignity which refer to, or are derived
from, fairly abstract ideas of the common human good or human
33 See, e.g., J. Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford 2008). Griffin prefers this bottom-up approach
according to which “one starts with human rights as used in our actual social life … and then sees
what higher principles one must resort to in order to explain their moral weight”: loc. cit., at 29.
34 In such cases, the dignity of the pregnant woman (in the Kantian sense that is bound up with her
autonomy) is pitted against that of the unborn foetus. It is much the same in the context of the
euthanasia debate where the sanctity of human life is placed in opposition to an individualised
notion of dignity proffered by a terminally ill person: see Pretty v. United Kingdom 24 E.H.R.R.
(1997) 423.
35 In R v. Keegstra, the Supreme Court of Canada linked the “fostering of human dignity” to the
“respect for the many racial, religious and cultural groups in our society”: [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 746
per Dickson C.J.
36 For full discussion of this right, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London 1978), ch. 12.
37 In fact, providing a water-tight and pragmatically purposeful definition of private law is a
remarkably difficult task with a variety of definitions – all of which suit different ends or beliefs
about the nature and purpose of private law – being possible: see, e.g., N.E. Simmonds, “The
Possibility of Private Law” in J. Tasioulas (ed.), Law, Values and Social Practices (Aldershot 1997)
and W. Lucy, “What’s Private about Private Law?” in A. Robertson and H.W. Tang, op. cit. n. 1.
38 Class actions are of course possible, but these generally only entail an aggregation of individual
actions rather than the pursuit en masse of some kind of communitarian goal.
39 The formulation here is an adaptation of Peter Birks’ definition of a tort: namely, “the breach of a
legal duty which affects the interests of an individual to a degree which the law regards as sufficient
to allow that individual to complain on his or her own account rather than as a representative of
society as a whole”: see P. Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in D. Owen (ed.), Philosophical
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford 1995), p. 51.
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flourishing.40 Such understandings offer little or nothing when it comes
to assessing the damages due in respect of a private law wrong done to
particular claimant X by defendant Y.
In the context of private law, we are concerned with what might be
called “individual dignity”.41 This entails the irreducible, intrinsic worth
of each human being simply by virtue of their personhood. Thus,
wherever an individual is subjected to conduct that constitutes or im-
plies some form of disregard for the innate values associated with per-
sonhood – be it their deliberate humiliation or objectification (in the
sense of treatment as though a mere thing or object) – that person can
be said to have suffered an affront to his or her dignity. It is the explicit
or implicit treatment of another in a manner which undermines or de-
means their human status or moral worth that comprises an affront to
dignity. It is treating them as though they were somehow worth less
than oneself, or simply worthless.42 It is a failure to show the minimum
equal measure of respect due to all persons.43
The innate values of personhood may well have theological roots –
according to which understanding all persons possess dignity because
they are made in the image of God44 – but they can be perfectly well
be captured in secular terms that are better suited to the purposes of
private law. An example of such secular expression is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which provides that “All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.45
Nor is there any need to premise the private lawyer’s understanding
of dignity on the Kantian approach which sees dignity as being inex-
tricably bound up with autonomy (because treating people with dignity
requires respecting their freedom to choose their own destiny), even if,
in general terms, this approach offers a good deal for human rights
lawyers and legal philosophers.46 Apart from avoiding the obvious
40 For insights into the various forms that these notions may take, see D. Feldman, “Human Dignity
as a Legal Value: Part 1” [1999] Public Law 682, at 684; C. McCrudden, “Human Dignity and
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 655,
at 658–660; P. Lee and R.P. George, “The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity” (2008) 21 Ratio
Juris 173, at 174–175.
41 For a similar conclusion that private law is concerned with “an interference with individuality”,
see E.J. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964)
39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 962, at 1003.
42 In this respect it closely resembles the gist of the Roman law tort of iniuria: see Birks, op. cit. n. 18,
at 5–14.
43 See Birks, loc. cit. To varying degrees, many people treat others in this way quite frequently. But if
this is all that they do – that is, if they treat them in this way without simultaneously committing
some or other recognised tort – their “wrongdoing” is not compensable as a freestanding tort.
Whether it should is another question, and the one that animates Birks’ enquiry.
44 For such an account see, e.g., G. Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, trans. C.G. Wallis
(Indianapolis 1965), p. 5.
45 For an equally secular account see Lee and George, op. cit. n. 40; McCrudden, op. cit. n. 40, at
664–672.
46 See, e.g., G. Bognetti, “The Concept of Human Dignity in European and US Constitutionalism”
in G. Nolte (ed.), EU and US Constitutionalism (Cambridge 2005), p. 79; McCrudden, op. cit.
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problems associated with explaining how the infantile, mentally in-
capacitated etc can be said to possess innate dignity when they clearly
lack the ability to make rational, autonomous choices, there is another
major advantage associated with viewing dignity in terms of the innate
moral worth of personhood. It is the ease with which this conception of
dignity can be grafted on to the kinds of in personam private law actions
in which aggravated damages are apt to be sought.
Before moving on to consider whether infringements to dignity
should be construed on an objective or subjective basis, and the various
ways in which the dignitary interest differs from the one in reputation,
there is one final point that ought to be made here. It is this: treatment
with dignity demands a certain irreducible respect for all persons sim-
ply because they are persons and not because they are the bearers of
certain rights. It is therefore a mistake to think, as Beever does,47 that a
person’s dignity will be infringed just because certain rights, such as
those generated by a contract, are ignored or denied. Dignity is inex-
tricably bound up with personhood in a way that mere contractual
entitlements very seldom are. As such, there must be more than a mere
deliberate breach of contract in order to injure another person’s dig-
nity. Similarly, the complete denial of even a basic human right – such
as the right to liberty in the case of a convicted prisoner – does not
necessarily imply that the person so denied has been treated without
dignity. Equally, although it is difficult to think of the dead as holders
of rights, it is perfectly possible to consider that their dignity endures.
This, as Grotius explained, is the reason why we must bury our dead
enemies: it “is to be found in the dignity of man” and “burial … cannot
be denied even to enemies, whom a state of warfare has not deprived of
the rights and nature of men”.48 The same personhood-rooted notion of
dignity also explains why some consider the unborn to possess human
dignity, too.49
B. Objective versus subjective injury to dignity
The burden of this section is to explore the import of Lord Devlin’s
reference in Rookes v. Barnard to the “injury to the plaintiff’s proper
feelings of dignity”. The important question in issue here is whether
aggravated damages are to be awarded in respect of an objective
affront to dignity, or whether they are available merely to repair the
claimant’s hurt feelings (implying a subjective loss). While the case law
n. 40; Feldman, op. cit. n. 40, Berryman, op. cit. n. 23; Dworkin, op. cit. n. 36, p. 198; Beever,
op. cit. n. 12, at 90; Griffin, op. cit. n. 33.
47 Beever, op. cit. n. 12, at 88–89.
48 H. Grotius,De Jure Belli ac Pacis, trans. A.C. Campbell (London 1814), Book II, ch. 19 (available
online at http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm).
49 See, e.g., Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, CETS No. 164 (1997), Preamble.
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contains many references to the latter,50 this need not be taken to imply
that only subjective losses are protected, or even that subjective losses
are the law’s prime concern.
Now, the matter is of importance because there is no reason why
one’s sense of indignity, on the one hand, and actual harm to one’s
dignity, on the other, need occur in tandem. The infantile, the severely
mentally incapacitated and the permanently unconscious are all in-
capable of experiencing a loss of dignity; but so long as dignity is seen
as being bound up with their very personhood, it is perfectly possible
for their dignity to be injured whether or not they are conscious of it.51
Even sentient adults can suffer an objective, but not subjective, loss of
dignity. The famous children’s story of The Emperor’s New Clothes
provides one graphic illustration. James Griffin’s hypothetical “un-
detected peeping Tom” provides another so long as we attach signifi-
cance to “nakedness and certain other culturally determined forms of
modesty”.52
In just the same way that an objective violation of dignity can occur
in isolation, so, too, can a subjective injury to one’s dignity occur in the
absence of any objective injury. Take, for example, an elderly patient in
hospital who is heavily dependent upon the ministrations of the nursing
staff. She may well feel a complete loss of her dignity – by virtue of
requiring bed baths, a commode or whatever – but in the eyes of others,
her enduring courage and self-respect point very much more readily to
the fact that, objectively and in the light of her admirable stoicism, she
has entirely retained her dignity. The overly proud and conceited are
also persons apt to suffer a sense of punctured pride but, in objective
terms, no genuine loss of dignity in their everyday dealings.
It is precisely because subjective and objective losses of dignity need
not go hand in hand that private law must grapple with the question of
what the appropriate basis for an award of aggravated damages should
be: an objective loss of dignity, a subjective loss or (conceivably) a
combination of the two? By far the most difficult candidate to justify
would be an award of aggravated damages grounded purely on a sub-
jective sense of loss: the claimant’s assertion, in other words, that he or
she feels abused, shamed, degraded or whatever. Can it be right that an
award should be made when no-one else – or at least no reasonable
person – shares this view? From a practical perspective, one would
suppose the answer to be in the negative for there would otherwise be a
real danger of fabricated claims succeeding. Moreover, even if the
50 See, e.g., Broome v. Cassell & Co Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1124 per Lord Diplock; AB v. South West
Water Services Ltd. [1993] Q.B. 507, 532 per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.; Kuddus v. Chief
Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at [50] per Lord Nicholls.
51 The right to dignity of the permanently unconscious receives extended treatment in Birks, op. cit.
n. 18.
52 J. Griffin, “The Human Right to Privacy” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev. 697, at 715–716.
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courts were able confidently to detect and dismiss such fabricated
claims, there would still be the problem that allowing claims on a sub-
jective basis would involve the adoption of an infinitely variable (and
therefore unworkable) standard according to which defendants would
be held liable. The principle of treating like cases alike would be left in
tatters.
In order to avoid committing itself to such an unworkable standard,
the Ontario Court of Appeal held that “[t]he assessment should be
undertaken from a subjective-objective perspective”; the perspective of
“a reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circum-
stances” yet “under similar circumstances … [to] the rights claimant”.53
And this concern to introduce an element of objectivity in order to
eschew the twin dangers of unworkable standards and fabricated
claims is very much the stuff of private law. In contract cases, for ex-
ample, the subjective-objective standard is used to gauge whether ex-
ceptional losses are too remote: the court must assess whether the loss
was “such as may reasonably be considered to have been in the con-
templation of the parties, at the time they made the contract”.54 In tort,
too, it is well established in the law of private nuisance that the hyper-
sensitive claimant will not succeed unless his claim also has some kind
of objective basis to it. As Knight-Bruce VC once put it, for an inter-
ference to constitute a nuisance, the claimant’s assertion that he has
been wrongly incommoded must be “more than fanciful, more than
one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness”; there must be an inconvenience
to “the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely
according to elegant or dainty modes of living, but according to plain
and simple notions among the English People”.55 In other words, the
judge must be sure not just that the claimant has suffered an incon-
venience, he or she must also be confident that the interference “would
disturb an ordinary man”.56 In short, the common law tradition, when
faced with the potential for artificially inflated claims, seems to be to
judge the losses of the claimant from a subjective-objective perspective.
Against this background, what are we to make of Lord Devlin’s
reference in Rookes v. Barnard to “the plaintiff’s proper feelings of
dignity or pride”. If we stress the word “feelings”, there is a suggestion
that what his Lordship saw as critical was the subjective aspect of dig-
nity. If, however, we pay heed to the accompanying adjective and
enquire as to what he meant by “proper feelings”, a rather different
picture emerges. This is because we are forced to enquire what it would
be proper for the claimant to complain about in just the same way that
53 Halpern v. Attorney-General [2003] 65 OR (3d.) 161, at 79.
54 (1854) 9 Exch. 341, at 354 per Alderson B.
55 Walter v. Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315, 322.
56 Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683, 698 per Veale J.
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the hypersensitive nuisance victim is required to show that an ordinary
man would also be disturbed in a way that goes beyond the ordinary
give and take of life. In other words, tethering aggravated damages to
the “proper feelings of dignity” of the claimant should be understood
as attaching them to a requirement that a reasonable person in the
claimant’s position would consider there to be an affront to dignity.
Indeed, it is by insisting that a reasonably minded third party – in
reality the court – would consider there to be an affront to dignity that
lends propriety to the claimant’s own sense of indignation or outrage.
As Lord Hailsham L.C. said in Broome v. Cassell & Co Ltd., “[i]n
awarding ‘aggravated’ damages the natural indignation of the court at
the injury inflicted on the plaintiff is a perfectly legitimate motive in
making a generous rather than a moderate award”.57
It is by insisting that any feelings of humiliation or punctured pride
asserted by the claimant should be proper in this sense that the common
law manages to avoid aggravated damages being awarded in respect of
fabricated claims or claims made by the overly proud or sensitive.
C. Differentiating between dignity and reputation
The failure to distinguish between dignity and reputation is by nomeans
novel. It has an ancient pedigree in that, under Roman Law, dignitas
formed the gist of the actio iniuriarum (the equivalent to a modern-day
defamation action); and the term dignitas hominis was essentially
understood in terms of a person’s status and honour.58 The confusion
between the two concepts – most obviously played out in the context
of defamation law – persists even today. Thus, for example, Post has
affirmed that “[t]he law of defamation can be conceived as a method by
which society polices breaches of its rules of deference and demeanour,
thereby protecting the dignity of its members”.59 In similar vein,
Berryman has asserted that “in defamation cases … compensation is
not awarded for a measurable harm but … for loss of dignity”.60
However, while an undeniable overlap between the two concepts
does exist, there are, as a matter of law, some very significant differ-
ences between our respective interests in dignity and reputation. Ac-
cordingly, any tendency to elide the two or to see them as coterminous
in the private law context is a potentially serious mistake to make in
57 [1972] A.C. 1027, 1073 (emphasis added).
58 H. Cancik, “‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero De
Officiis I 105–107” in D. Kretzmer and E. Klein, The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights
Discourse (The Hague 2002), p. 19.
59 See, e.g., R.C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution” (1986) 74 California L. Rev. 691, at 710. See also the American Convention on
Human Rights 1969, Art 11(1): “Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his
dignity recognized”.
60 Berryman, op. cit. n. 23, at 1527.
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defamation cases where aggravated damages are often sought. To be-
gin with, in the absence of the commission of a recognised tort, there is
no available remedy in the English law of torts merely for causing
someone else to lose their dignity. To put the matter more bluntly:
simply to injure another’s dignity is not prima facie a tort:61 the injury
must occur, as was noted earlier, in tandem with the commission of
some or other recognised tort. By contrast, to defame someone – and
by definition to inflict a loss of reputation – is to commit a free-
standing tort.
At the heart of this first distinction is the fact that English tort law
recognises a right to reputation, but no more than an interest in dignity;
and it is overwhelmingly the infringement of a primary right that
grounds an action in tort.62 There is nothing in English common law
that comes close to suggesting that a person’s interest in dignity is so
important an interest as to warrant the appellation “legal right”. Even
within the scheme of the European Convention on Human Rights it
possesses no higher status than that of a foundational principle from
which other, more specific rights emanate.63 It is therefore impossible to
maintain that a right to dignity has been imported into English law via
the Human Rights Act 1998 or that the common law ought to develop
in line an extant Convention right to dignity.64 This, then, is the first and
most profound difference between the often related, but nonetheless
discrete, interests in dignity and reputation. While all rights reflect
human interests, not all human interests constitute exigible rights.
A second point of distinction between dignity and reputation
inheres in the fact that while dignity is an innate moral and human
attribute, best seen as being bound up with personhood, reputation is
different. Human dignity is a constant.65 It is a uniform value that does
not vary from one person to the next. Scoundrels and philanthropists
61 It is a failure to recognise this that undermines Peter Birks’ otherwise fairly valuable contribution
to the understanding of aggravated damages. In his view, “[i]f enhanced damages protect a distinct
interest, and if that interest is in an equality of respect, then there is a distinct tort of contemptuous
harassment” because “an independent tort is a breach of a duty designed to protect a distinct
interest according to a given principle of liability”: Birks, op. cit. n. 18, at 32. But this is
demonstrably wrong in so far as the tort of negligence very obviously protects a wide range of
interests, and equally obviously sits at the head of the family of torts. In cutting across a range of
interests in this way, negligence is not alone. Descheemaeker, for example, has shown how
defamation law shares this characteristic of protecting no fewer than four different kinds of
interest: see E. Descheemaeker, “Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence” (2009) 29
O.J.L.S. 603, at 611–617.
62 See Stevens, op. cit. n. 2. While there are a number of exceptions to this rule, none of these
exceptions has anything to do with the claimant’s dignitary interest: see J. Murphy, “Rights,
Reductionism and Tort Law” (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 393, at 399–405.
63 Cf the position in German Law where dignity enjoys the status of a fundamental human right.
According to the Grundgesetz, Art 1, “Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall
be the duty of all state authority”: see the English translation at www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/
GG.htm#1.
64 See D. Feldman, op. cit. n. 40; McCrudden, op. cit. n. 40.
65 For a detailed natural law argument as to why all human beings possess the same “full moral
worth”, see Lee and George, op. cit. n. 40, at 181–182.
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alike are endowed with precisely the same human dignity, simply by
virtue of being people, and recognition of this evident in the rule of law
insofar as it insists that all are equal before and under the law.
Reputations, by contrast, can vary greatly. They have a quasi-pro-
prietary quality;66 and it is the very fact that a reputation can be di-
minished or lost that animates the law of defamation.
A third difference, as we have already seen, stems from the fact that
infringements of dignity are not contingent upon the knowledge or
involvement of third parties. This much is clear from another leading
case on aggravated damages: Thompson v. Commissioner of Police for
the Metropolis.67 In that case, Mrs Thompson was arrested at 5.00am
and subsequently mistreated in police custody with no witnesses pres-
ent at any stage. However, the court made clear that,
[a]ggravating features can include humiliating circumstances at
the time of arrest or any conduct of those responsible for the
arrest…which shows that they had behaved in a high handed,
insulting, malicious or oppressive manner.68
This recognition that high-handed treatment of the claimant at the time
of arrest, without there being any onlookers, stands in obvious contrast
to defamation law’s insistence upon publication to a third party.69
Recall, the gist of a defamation action is not an injury to the claimant’s
self-esteem, but a diminution in the esteem in which others hold the
claimant.70 Indeed, the very name of the tort, defamation, draws on the
Roman lawyers’ concept of fama, connoting “good name, reputation,
fame, renown”.71 One’s good name, reputation, fame and renown exist
only in the minds of others.
A fourth difference between a claim for aggravated damages and a
claim in defamation is the following rather technical one. While the
right to sue for loss of reputation is extendable to trading corpor-
ations,72 the concept of dignity – bound up as it is with personhood and
the innate worth we attach to it – is something that could only ever
66 It is proprietary in the Lockean sense, for as Cheryl Harris has explained “[t]he idea of self-
ownership [in Locke’s time] … was particularly fertile ground for the idea that reputation, as an
aspect of identity earned through effort, was … property’: “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106
Harvard L. Rev. 1707, at 1735. For a similar conclusion, see B. Chapman, “Punitive Damages as
Aggravated Damages: The Case of Contract” (1990) 16 Canadian Bus. L. J. 269.
67 [1998] Q.B. 401.
68 [1998] Q.B. 498, at 516 per Woolf M.R. (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., Pullman v. Walter Hill & Co [1891] 1 Q.B. 524, 527 per Lord Esher M.R.; Huth v. Huth
[1915] 3 K.B. 32, 38 per Lord Reading C.J.
70 See, e.g., Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 per Lord Atkin; Rubber Improvement Ltd. v.
Daily Telegraph Ltd. [1964] A.C. 234, 285 per Lord Devlin; Drummond-Jackson v. BMA [1970] 1
All E.R. 1094, 1104 per Lord Pearson.
71 See Descheemaeker, op. cit. n. 61, at 609.
72 As Kay L.J. once explained, a company has a “trading character which may be destroyed by libel”:
South Hetton Coal Co. v. North Eastern News Association [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 147. For recent
confirmation see Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 3
W.L.R. 642.
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meaningfully be invoked by a human claimant.73 A fifth distinction
would also appear to exist. It derives from the fact that, while the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 generally allows for the
survival of causes of action vested in a deceased person, it makes an
express exception in the case of defamation.74 In other words, although
a legitimate claim for aggravated damages could well be pursued by the
estate of a deceased person where that person has been the victim of,
say, a battery, no such facility will exist with respect to any defamation
claim. So much was as good as confirmed by the House of Lords in
Ashley v. Chief Contsable of Sussex.75
In that case, one of the issues for the House of Lords was whether
the estate of a man who had been shot as a result of a genuine but
mistaken belief on the part of an armed policeman could pursue before
their Lordships a claim based on assault and battery. The defendant
Chief Constable had previously conceded that, should he be found
liable for negligence, he would be prepared to pay full compensatory
damages including a sum by way of aggravated damages. He therefore
argued that the assault and battery action had nothing further to yield,
for there was nothing more that the claimants could hope to obtain if
the claim were allowed to proceed. Part of the reason why their
Lordships were, however, prepared to allow the battery claim to pro-
ceed was a general perception of the propriety of seeking aggravated
damages on the basis of that tort rather than on the basis of negligence.
What they did not seriously question was whether aggravated damages
could be claimed by the victim’s estate.76
IV. AGGRAVATED DAMAGES IN NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRACT
It is generally thought that aggravated damages cannot be awarded in
the context of either a negligence action or one based on breach of
contract. In Kralj v. McGrath,77 a case in which aggravated damages
were sought in connection with a patient who had been subjected to
73 For this reason the award of aggravated damages to the claimant corporation in Messenger
Newspaper Group Ltd. v. National Geographic Association [1984] I.R.L.R. 397 should be seen as
dubious. It could be argued that certain other animal species warrant treatment in accordance with
basic dignity; but such arguments go beyond the scope of this paper and in any case do not affect
the point made in the text about trading corporations.
74 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s 1(1).
75 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 A.C. 962.
76 The closest that any of their Lordships got to disputing this was in the speech of Lord Carswell
when he said of the victim: “it is more than a little difficult to see how such damages can be in
question, when it is very questionable whether the deceased was conscious and sentient for any
significant period between the shooting and his death”: ibid., at [80]. Implicit in this, however, is
the acceptance that, if such damages were due in the first place, they could readily be claimed by
the deceased’s estate. Similarly, Lord Neuberger, who delivered the other dissenting speech, had
no objection to the idea of claims for aggravated damages being able to survive; he simply felt that,
as a matter of the court’s discretion, the battery claim should not be allowed to survive in this case.
77 [1986] 1 All E.R. 54.
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outrageous treatment by the defendant during childbirth, Woolf J said
this:
It is my view that it would be wholly inappropriate to introduce
into claims of this sort, for breach of contract and negligence, the
concept of aggravated damages. If it were to apply in this situation
of a doctor not treating a patient in accordance with his duty,
whether under contract or in tort, then I would consider that it
must apply in other situations where a person is under a duty to
exercise care. It would be difficult to see why it could not even
extend to cases where [actions for] damages are brought for per-
sonal injuries in respect of driving. If the principle is right, a higher
award of damages would be appropriate in a case of reckless
driving which caused injury than would be appropriate in cases
where careless driving caused identical injuries. Such a result
seems to me to be wholly inconsistent with the general approach to
damages in this area, which is to compensate the plaintiff for the
loss that she has actually suffered, so far as it is possible to do so,
by the award of monetary compensation and not to treat those
damages as being a matter which reflects the degree of negligence
or breach of duty of the defendant.78
This precise dictum received the express approval of Stuart-Smith L.J.
in AB v. South West Water Ltd.,79 but it is submitted that the reasoning
displayed in this passage is fundamentally flawed by virtue of a false
assumption about the ways in which a breach of contract, or the tort of
negligence, can be committed.
To begin with it is important to revisit the example of the acciden-
tally and deliberately spilled drinks given earlier. The key difference, it
will be recalled, lay in the fact that only in the case of a deliberately
pouring of a drink over a fellow customer in a cafe´ could a claim for
aggravated damages be countenanced. Thus, assuming that aggravated
damages will only be available on occasions when the defendant has
deliberately wronged the claimant,80 the critical thing is not to presume
that such conduct is necessarily absent in all negligence cases and in all
cases of breach of contract, but rather to explore whether this is so.
Only then may aggravated damages be suitably ruled out in those
contexts.
A. Negligence
It is often thought that the tort of negligence can only be committed
through inadvertent or otherwise non-intentional conduct. If this were
so, it would be difficult to imagine how a defendant could be said to
78 Ibid., at 61.
79 [1993] Q.B. 507, 528.
80 For reasons explored fully below, it is possible for D occasionally to be liable for aggravated
damages even though D was not personally guilty of deliberate wrongdoing towards C.
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have treated a claimant’s rights with the requisite contempt to cause an
affront to his or her dignity. Any loss or injury resulting from such
conduct would lack the intentionality that underpins the kinds of high-
handed, arrogant and outrageous conduct to which the judges faith-
fully advert in cases concerning aggravated damages. As it turns out,
however, this rather commonplace assumption is unfounded.
In order to determine the narrow question of whether any given
defendant has acted negligently, we must address the question of whe-
ther he or she acted in breach of a duty of care. And in order to answer
that question, we need only know whether the defendant’s conduct fell
short of the standard we might expect of the reasonable man. Once this
point is grasped, there is no reason in logic or law why intentional or
reckless conduct cannot ground a successful negligence action.81
Indeed, according to one Australian judge, “[m]ost acts of what we call
actionable negligence are in fact wholly or partly a product of inten-
tional conduct”.82 And as Conor Gearty has argued:
It is no answer to the action [in negligence] to say that, far from
being negligent, D positively wanted or consciously risked the
damage. It would be absurd if this were the case… [For] why
should the owner of an oil tank escape liability for the negligent
discharge of its contents by convincing the court that he desired
this very eventuality? … The tort of negligence embraces, as it
logically must, a tort of intention.83
Judicial recognition of the point in this jurisdiction does exist in the
speech of Lord Neuberger in the Ashley case considered earlier. He
began by making the familiar observation that aggravated damages are
awarded “as a result of the particularly egregious way or circumstances
in which the tort was committed”.84 He then noted that such conduct is
not necessarily incompatible with the law of negligence adding that,
“[i]f that is so, I cannot see why such damages should not logically be
recoverable in some categories of negligence claims”.85 More import-
antly, however, he then went on to say this:
It appears to me that it would be reminiscent of the bad old days of
forms of action if the court held that the Ashleys’ claim could
result in aggravated damages if framed in battery, but not if
framed in negligence. In my view, there is a strong enough case for
81 In Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 Q.B. 232, 239, Lord Denning M.R. attempted to rule out actions in
battery based on negligent conduct. However, he did not say anything specific about the
possibility of intentional acts grounding an action in negligence (even though, arguably, his obiter
remarks were aimed at forging a clear separation between the two torts).
82 Carrier v. Bonham [2001] Q.C.A. 234.
83 C. Gearty, “The Place of Nuisance in the Modern Law of Torts” [1989] C.L.J. 214, at 223. See also
G. Williams and B. Hepple, Foundations of the Law of Tort (London 1984), p. 124 and Cane,
op. cit. n. 1, p. 100.
84 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 A.C. 962, at [102].
85 Ibid.
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saying that aggravated damages would be recoverable for the
instant negligence.86
With this observation in mind, the potential scope for granting aggra-
vated damages in some cases of negligence would seem plain enough.87
But there may even be a way in which mere inadvertent conduct could
suffice.
Once it is grasped that adverting to the defendant’s high-handed or
egregious conduct serves merely as a useful means by which the viol-
ation of the claimant’s dignity may objectively be gauged, the question
naturally arises whether such conduct is a genuine precondition of
suing for aggravated damages. In favour of such an argument, would
be the ostensibly plausible contention that any behaviour falling short
of this would be incapable of amounting to a sufficient disregard for the
personhood of the claimant so as to constitute an infringement of his or
her dignity. To illustrate the point, it is perfectly true to say that in a run
of the mill negligence case – which will not be characterised by egregious
conduct – the defendant will not have done anything that is tanta-
mount to denying the moral worth of the claimant. Defendant, D, can
genuinely maintain at one and the same time that he never relinquished
his respect for the rights and bodily integrity of the claimant, C, yet also
admit that he injured C by virtue of his careless driving. But does this
mean that mere inadvertent wrongdoing – archetypal negligence, in
other words – can never be said to violate the claimant’s dignity?
One possible answer to this question can be found in a case of
negligent false imprisonment: W v. Home Office.88 In that case, the
claimant was an asylum seeker whose papers became confused with
those relating to someone else, due to administrative carelessness. As a
consequence of the mistake, the claimant suffered a period of wrongful
detention. Those directly responsible for his confinement were relative
men of straw, so the claimant pursued a negligence action against the
Home Office on the basis of vicarious liability. And although ulti-
mately the claimant’s action failed for reasons that are irrelevant for
present purposes, it was accepted in principle that loss of liberty could
form the gist of a negligence action.89 This is important to the extent
86 Ibid., at [101].
87 Beever, too, suggests that aggravated damages should be available in negligence. However, he
attempts to justify his claim by reference to the following example which is redolent more of deceit
than negligence: “I negligently injure a person, then send a team of lawyers who on my instructions
convince him with undue pressure that he has no cause of action when I know that such an action
has good foundation”: Beever, op. cit. n. 12, at n. 28. In his own terms this is a case of Hegelian
“deception” rather than an Hegelian “ordinary” wrong, and as he somewhat contradictorily avers
(at 93), “acts of negligence … are [mere] ‘ordinary’ wrongs”; the kind that do not attract
aggravated damages.
88 [1997] Imm. A.R. 302.
89 For a fuller account of this and a number of similar cases, see D. Nolan, “New Forms of Damage
in Negligence” (2007) 70 M.L.R. 59, at 62–67.
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that it is well established that the tort of false imprisonment can ground
a claim for aggravated damages. So, where a false imprisonment has
occurred by virtue of an administrative error, is it possible to identify a
suitable measure of contempt or disregard for the claimant’s moral
worth? Arguably, it is.
In the criminal law, where the future liberty of the accused is fre-
quently at stake, proper respect for his or her rights – but especially his
right to liberty – finds expression in the criminal standard of proof.
This very high standard operates as a check on wrongful convictions
(and therefore false imprisonment) and it reflects the fact that liberty is
one of what Griffin calls the substantive values of personhood.90 In W’s
case, however, there was no such check. The administrative system was
woefully shoddy despite W’s liberty being at stake. The operation of
such a flawed system – one that lacks appropriate checks and double
checks – could conceivably been seen in terms of a sufficient disregard
for the liberty of W and others and hence an affront to their dignity.
Recalling the objective element canvassed earlier, it is eminently poss-
ible that a reasonable person could reach the conclusion that the casual
mismanagement of a case involving another’s liberty amounted to an
affront to their dignity.91
Finally in this context it is perhaps worth stressing that, had W’s
action succeeded in negligence, it would have been the administrator’s
employer that would have been vicariously liable and therefore re-
quired to pay the aggravated damages. That, too, is potentially sig-
nificant given that vicarious liability is generally taken to entail liability
regardless of personal fault.92 For this reason, too, it is difficult to
maintain firmly that high-handed or oppressive conduct on the part of
any given defendant is a genuine precondition of an award of aggra-
vated damages: while employee X may have behaved in such a way,
employer Y (who is ultimately sued) need not.
B. Contract
The argument against granting aggravated damages in cases of breach
of contract is unclear to the extent that it is seldom if ever spelled out. If
one proceeds along the lines of insisting that aggravated damages serve
an essentially punitive function, then a host of familiar objections
90 Griffin argues forcefully that liberty is one of three “highest level human rights” and a constituent
element in personhood: see Griffin, op. cit. n. 33, ch. 9.
91 The objection that although “the wrong is in some sense ‘outrageous’ (as, for instance, for showing
a shocking lack of professional skill) cannot make it into a contempt” (Birks, op. cit. n. 18, at 20),
is unconvincing on its own terms. Those things which cause outrage and shock do so precisely
because we consider them to be blows way below the belt: the very stuff of contemptuous
treatment.
92 But for a creditable defence of the largely discredited “master’s tort” version of vicarious liability,
see Stevens, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 259–267.
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concerning punishment within the civil law arise. But if one’s view is
that aggravated damages serve a compensatory function – as has been
argued here – then these objections are immediately emasculated.
Furthermore, when one bears in mind that it is perfectly possible to
commit a blatant breach of contract that may cause just as much an
affront to dignity as many forms of tortious wrongdoing, there begins
to appear the germs of a case for the use of aggravated damages in this
context. The case can then be strengthened by reference to those con-
tract law theories which have at their core the values inherent in
promising and trustworthiness.93 These values, though by no means
synonymous with dignity, are clearly linked to it in so far as they place
emphasis on trust and respect. As such, blatant breaches of promises
(and the trust that they engender) can perfectly well be seen as capable
of causing an affront to dignity.
Canadian law is instructive in this respect. In the case of Whiten v.
Pilot Insurance Co94 the appellant and her husband discovered a fire at
their home. They managed to escape the flames but the fire destroyed
the house. Thereafter, in clear bad faith, their insurers sought to deny
any liability alleging among other things that the appellant and her
husband were arsonists who had started the fire themselves. The in-
tention behind this groundless denial of liability was to force the
Whitens to accept a settlement well below the sum due under the in-
surance contract. At the heart of the insurance company’s ploy was
coercion. And coercion would amount to an infringement of dignity on
just about any account of that concept and would certainly constitute a
violation of the Whitens’ normative agency or personhood.95
In the Supreme Court, Binnie J was prepared to award punitive
damages (as sought by the Whitens in their statement of claim) noting
that a “breach of the contractual duty of good faith is independent of
and in addition to the breach of contractual duty to pay the loss”.96
Importantly, he went on to remark that “[p]unitive damages are very
much the exception rather than the rule, [and ] … imposed only if there
has been high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible
misconduct that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards
of decent behaviour”.97 In other words, though punitive damages were
actually dispensed in that case, the language used by the judge was
93 See, e.g., C. Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1981), p. 17.
94 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.
95 For the intimate inter-relation between normative agency and personhood, see Griffin, op. cit.
n. 33, pp. 44–48.
96 Ibid., at [79]. American case law also recognises that an insurer owes to the insured an implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing according to which it is bound to do nothing to deprive the insured
of the benefits of the policy. The duty entails the obligation to act reasonably and in good faith to
settle claims: see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal. 2d. 425; Fletcher v.Western National Life
Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d. 376.
97 Ibid., at [94].
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precisely the kind of language used in English aggravated damages
cases.
There are only really two potentially significant arguments against
the invocation of aggravated damages in contract law. The first stems
from the proposition that, since respect for dignity is never a contrac-
tual term, it must follow that compensation for an affront to dignity
caused by a deliberate breach must be beyond the remediable pale. The
promisee, so the argument would have it, has no genuine expectation
that the promisor will act with a view to respecting his or her dignity.
The second argument follows from the lawyer-economists’ contention
that efficient breach is permissible.
The first objection can presumably be met by reference to a rec-
ognised implied term of mutual respect between the parties for the
established rules of contracting. The very fact that the defendant has
promised X carries with it an implied promise that the claimant can rely
on him to respect the contractual rights now conferred upon the
claimant by honouring his side of the bargain by performing as agreed.
Such implied terms really need to exist if contract law is to function
effectively.98 If a bystander were to ask either of the parties whether
mutual respect and trust was important to their agreement, they would
no doubt answer him with the famous “oh, of course!” so familiar to
contract lawyers. So, once it is accepted that such an implied term
exists, it becomes readily apparent that any malicious breach of con-
tract – whereby the promisor flagrantly attempts to deny that the
promisee has a particular contractual right (such as the right to the
insurance payment in Whiten) – is apt to cause an affront to dignity
and thus warrant an award of aggravated damages.99
98 It could be argued that because English law’s default remedy is damages rather than specific
performance, it is hard to square the parties’ expectation that they would have to pay damages in
the event of a breach with an implied term along the lines argued here. However, this objection
presupposes that the rules on remedies both (a) comprise part of the law of contract and (b) speak
to the nature and existence of contractual obligations when neither should be presumed. As
Stephen Smith has ably shown “contract law, properly understood, is limited to the rules that
govern the creation and content of contractual obligations”: S.A. Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford
2003), p. 388. Equally, as he goes on to show, an order for specific performance requires more by
way of justification than the mere fact that it would give effect to a primary obligation. “That I
have a duty to perform does not, in itself, justify a court in ordering me to perform” in just the
same way that although I have “a duty to drive carefully, no one would imagine that this justifies a
court in ordering me to drive carefully”: loc. cit., pp. 390–1.
99 English law comes close to the position argued for here insofar as the House of Lords has
recognised that, in principle, a claimant should be entitled to sue on the basis of an implied term of
trust and confidence in circumstances where breach of this term is likely to stigmatise the claimant.
Such claims, however, have tended to fail on the grounds that, the wrongful dismissal cases in
which they have been raised, are not apt to accommodate them for policy reasons associated with
the background statutory framework: see Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 A.C.
518;Malik v. BCCI [1998] A.C. 20. In the latter case Lord Steyn was explicit (at 51) in reiterating
the longstanding rule that “an employee cannot recover exemplary or aggravated damages for
wrongful dismissal” adding that this was “still sound law”. But note just how narrow his exclusion
is: it is linked purely to cases of wrongful dismissal. It therefore does not preclude the argument
advanced here in favour of the availability of aggravated damages elsewhere in the general law of
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Turning to the lawyer-economists’ objection, it would run thus. If
efficient breach is generally considered acceptable, then it simply can-
not be maintained that a deliberate breach – no matter how insulting –
should ever warrant an award of aggravated damages. The defendant is
merely doing something he is entitled to do and thus displays no es-
pecial contempt for the rights of the claimant. This objection can be
met on at least two grounds. First, it can be sidelined from an English
perspective on the simple basis that while the economic approach to
law has a very respectable pedigree on the other side of the Atlantic, it
has never really taken root in this jurisdiction. More generally, how-
ever, the contention can also be rebutted on the footing that the lawyer-
economist is failing to make a distinction here between a simple
efficient breach (in which the promisor does not deny the promisee his
right to sue for damages, but merely engages in a deliberate yet non-
malicious breach) and malicious breach (such as the one in Whiten) in
which the promisor is in bad faith seeking to deny that the promisee has
any contractual rights at all. The difference, of course, broadly reflects
the Hegelian scheme of wrongs which, although originally designed to
justify the use of punishment, can also be usefully invoked in the con-
text of aggravated damages.100 On balance, then, the stronger argu-
ments seem to lie in favour of the possibility of aggravated damages
within contract. And sinceWhiten was decided, the Canadian Supreme
Court has since confirmed the availability of aggravated damages
within contract in that jurisdiction.101
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have tried to elucidate the distinctive nature of, and a
particular role for, aggravated damages in English law. In doing so, the
primary task was expose the flaws that beset the two most prominent
existing accounts of such damages. Thereafter, I attempted to elaborate
a serviceable understanding of the dignitary interest which they protect.
contract. Indeed, in many respects, the dictum as a whole might be thought very much in tune
with it.
100 For a brief elaboration of the tripartite Hegelian scheme, see Beever, op. cit. n. 12, at 88–89. But
note that only a two-way division is employed here; for although Beever separates cases of
deception from cases of coercion (on the basis that whereas the former amounts to a denial that X
is worthy of the rights he claims, the latter amounts to an outright denial that X has any such
rights) it seems to me that the distinction need not be made in the present context. This is because
where compensation for an affront to dignity (rather than punishment) is in issue, it is just as likely
that treating X as though he is not worthy of rights will cause an affront to dignity just as readily as
treating X as though he does not possess rights at all. Equally, asserting, as Beever does (at 90),
that it is only in cases of coercion that aggravated damages are warranted fails to explain the award
of (what English lawyers would call) aggravated damages in cases like Whiten. In sum: although
Hegel would wish to distinguish cases of deception and from cases of coercion for the purposes of
justifying punishment, the distinction serves no purpose where what is in question is whether C’s
dignity has been violated by some or other high-handed or arrogant conduct on the part of D.
101 See, e.g., Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3 and Honda Canada Inc v.
Keays [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362.
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I suggested that within the context of private law, infringements of
dignity are best understood in terms of the inappropriate valuation of
others’ inherent moral worth; failing to pay proper regard, in other
words, to the innate and constitutive values of personhood.
Having settled upon a workable understanding of what dignity en-
tails, it was also stressed that affronts to dignity are not exigible in their
own right102 and that, rather like a number of other interests that are
not independently actionable in private law,103 an affront to dignity is
compensable only as a form of consequential loss.104 In other words,
quite beyond the violation of some or other primary right (to, say,
bodily integrity or reputation), the claimant (or his representatives)
must also show treatment that in some objectively verifiable way de-
means or devalues him.105 The significance of objective verification was
shown to be threefold: it ensured that aggravated damages were not
available only to the sentient; it ensured consistency within the com-
mon law which elsewhere shuns subjective measures of damages; it
ruled out the prospect of entirely bogus claims based purely on the
claimant’s assertion that he has suffered injury to his sense of pride.
Finally, having evinced a serviceable understanding of aggravated
damages and the interest they protect, it was suggested that, insofar as
it is possible to commit both the tort of negligence and a breach of
contract in high-handed and malicious ways, there seems no good
reason to exclude aggravated damages from those contexts. It certainly
seems anomalous that a wanton breach of the duty of care in the tort of
negligence, or an equally wanton disregard of one’s contractual obli-
gation to make an insurance payment should not carry the potential for
an award of aggravated damages in English law.106
102 Of course, it could be argued that dignity should be independently exigible, and there have
certainly been calls for formal recognition of an independent tort according to which a right to
dignity would be actionable. For Peter Birks, the creation of tort of “contemptuous harassment”
was the right answer (see Birks, op. cit. n. 18); while for Re´aume, a tort of “intentional outrage to
dignity” was the way forward (see D. Re´aume, “Indignities: Making a Place for Dignity inModern
Legal Thought” (2002) 28 Queen’s Law Journal. 61). This is an interesting question that arguably
warrants further exploration; but it falls beyond the scope of the present endeavour to offer a
robust explanatory account of the law as it stands.
103 For example, defamation law allows parasitic claims in respect of loss of custom (see Ratcliffe v.
Evans [1892] 2 Q.B. 524), though no independent right to have paying customers exists. It also
allows a parasitic claim in respect of the loss of free food and drinks resulting from being shunned
by one’s former acquaintances (Davies v. Solomon (1871–72) L.R. 7 Q.B. 112), though clearly there
is no freestanding right to free food and drinks. For other examples of consequential losses that
can be claimed only parasitically, see Stevens, op. cit. n. 2, ch. 3.
104 For the suggestion that, in defamation law, the protection of dignity and various other interests “is
parasitic” in the sense that the claimant must first show injury to his reputation, see
Descheemaeker, op. cit. n. 61, at 616.
105 Notably, in its own review of the area, the Ontario Law Reform Commission considered that an
objective affront to dignity per se should be an acceptable basis upon which to claim aggravated
damages: Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Exemplary Damages (1991), pp. 27–30.
106 Arguably, a malicious wrongful dismissal should be treated likewise ‘despite the courts’ reluctance
thus far to take this step’.
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Finally, and admittedly tentatively, it was suggested that in some
cases, high-handed and arrogant conduct may not be required at all.
However, it is readily conceded that the plausibility of these arguments
turns on what answers are given to two difficult questions which fall
beyond the purview of this essay: whether false imprisonment ought to
be capable of being grounded on the basis of negligence and whether
the master’s tort explanation of vicarious liability is the most compel-
ling. These are difficult questions for another day.107
107 Some preliminary sources are, however, these: (i) on the plausibility of “the master’s tort”
understanding of vicarious liability, see R. Stevens, “Vicarious Liability or Vicarious Action?”
(2007) 123 L.Q.R. 30); (ii) on the juridical sense of permitting claims for false imprisonment where
the tortfeasor has been merely careless, see ‘Nolan, op. cit, n. 89’.
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